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"We will be the winner of this war [Iran-Iraq 
War] and no one should doubt its outcome." 
Ayatollah Khomeini1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Middle East is perhaps the most volatile region in the world to-
day. Aj the same time, it is the most militarized region of the Third 
World and the scene of some of the most frantic arms transfers the world 
has ever witnessed. The combination of political volatility and militariza-
tion has made the region susceptible to cataclysmic changes with far-
reaching implications for the West as well as for the Middle Eastern 
states themselves. 
The Iran-Iraq War is a clear manifestation of this reality. The con-
flict is ostensibly between the two Persian Gulf countries over land 
border territories and the Shatt al-Arab waterway. In actual fact, 
however, the parameter of the conflict has expanded beyond the 
geographic boundaries of Iran and Iraq. The participants in the Gulf 
conflict (direct and indirect players) have included such ideologically and 
politically diverse nations as North Korea and Israel, Libya and Syria, 
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and small Gulf states of Kuwait, Oman and 
the United Arab Emirates, as well as the two super powers and France. 
The conflict has threatened to pit the United States against Iran in light 
of the latter's pronouncements regarding the closure of the Strait of Hor-
muz through which over sixty percent of Japanese and Western oil sup-
plies flow. 
The Iran-Iraq War is also demonstrably different from other intra-
Third World wars in terms of its destructiveness and unique alliance for-
mations. More than 200,000 people on both sides have been killed or 
wounded since the war's inception in September 1980, and over two 
million people have become homeless as a result of Iraqi shelling and 
aerial bombardment of Iranian cities. 
It appears that the conflict has molded itself along two axes of 
power: Iraq, supported by the conservative pro-Western Gulf states, Jor-
dan and Egypt, with peripheral support from the United States, and 
Iran, supported by "radical" Arab states of Syria and Libya, as well as 
by Israel, North Korea, and more recently, by the People's Republic of 
China. The role these countries have played in the continuation of the 
war, their motives and the reasons behind allying themselves militarily 
with the major belligerents in the war and how outside interference by 
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other Third World countries has contributed to the prolongation of the 
war will be analyzed in this paper. 
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
AND THE IRANIAN-ARAB TENSIONS 
The Islamic revolution, which overthrew the monarchy in Iran in 
1979, introduced uncertainties to Iranian-Arab relations in general and 
to Tehran's relations with the littoral states of the Persian Gulf in par-
ticular. The Islamic Republic's religious overtones brought a new dimen-
sion to Iran's foreign policy — Pan-Islamism. Moreover, Iran's percep-
tion of its security changed dramatically. Former supporters of the 
Shah's regime, especially the United States, were not perceived to be ma-
jor threats to the country's stability. As a result, Iran's attitude toward 
the region was determined by the relationship of each country in the 
region toward the United States. The conservative pro-Western Arab 
regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, began to view the new Iranian regime 
of Ayatollah Khomeini as a threat to their own stability. The Saudi royal 
family's claim to the leadership of the Islamic community was challenged 
by Ayatollah Khomeini on the grounds that the Saudi monarchy was cor-
rupt and morally incapable of acting as the guardian of Islamic holy 
places. Iranian officials were quick to point out King Fahd's overseas ex-
ploits and his reputation as a "playboy" when he was the Saudi crown 
prince just before King Khaled's death in mid-1982. Further, Pan-
Islamic proclamations of Khomeini and his exhortations to the Arab 
masses to follow Iran's example by overthrowing their own "corrupt" 
government creating a united Islamic front against the "enemies of 
Islam" contributed to the already tense situation in the region. Marked 
by these underlying factors, Iranian/Arabian clashes have occurred on 
several occasions. 
First, in the annual haj (pilgrimage) to Mecca in 1981, Saudi police 
attacked some Iranian pilgrims who had demonstrated against the U.S. 
and Israel and who had propogated Khomeini's philosophy of revolu-
tion. In an exchange of letters with King Khaled, Khomeini vigorously 
protested the treatment of Iranian pilgrims by the Saudi police, saying 
that their only guilt was to downgrade "satanic" America and protest 
the occupation of Islamic holy places by Israel.2 The Saudis, on their 
part, called the fundamentalist theocracy in Iran "un-Islamic," while a 
Saudi Arabian broadcast named the Iranian rulers a "disgrace to Islam. 
They have wronged Islam and brought disrepute to its followers. In fact, 
the rulers of Iran have nothing to do with Islam."3 
Regular, acrimonious exchanges between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
peaked once again during the 1982 and 1983 haj. The Saudis moved 
swiftly to arrest pro-Khomeini demonstrators and expell hundreds of Ira-
nian pilgrims, including Hojatoleslam Mohammad Hussein Musavi 
Khoiniha, Khomeini's personal representative and the supervisor of the 
Iranian haj delegation.4 Once again, Tehran accused Riyadh of acting on 
orders of "satanic America" and preventing millions of Moslem pilgrims 




Another major point of contention between Khomeini's Iran and 
the Arab states is the often-made claim by the latter that Iran routinely 
intervenes in Arab domestic affairs by either inciting the local Shi'ite 
population or using "saboteurs" in an attempt to overthrow their 
regimes. In December 1980, Bahrain announced the arrest of a group of 
"plotters" who had allegedly been trained by Iranians to overthrow the 
Bahrain government and create an Islamic republic on that island. This 
claim was vehemently denied by Tehran. The announcement, never-
theless, "triggered a wave of anxiety in the region, [and] brought a 
massive expression of Arab support to Bahrain, for many years a target 
of occasional Iranian territorial claim."5 
Iranian views on oil pricing and production policies have been 
another source of friction between that country and other oil producing 
areas of the Persian Gulf. The Khomeini regime has justifiably blamed 
Saudi Arabia for overproduction of oil and the creation of the current 
glut in the market. By branding the Saudi regime as "a puppet of the 
West,"6 the Iranian regime has endeavoured to isolate Saudi Arabia and 
reduce its influence on OPEC pricing and marketing decisions. 
Allocation of the production ceiling among OPEC s members — a 
move engineered in 1981 to maintain order in the pricing structure — was 
perceived by Iran to be disadvantageous to its position. Consequently, 
Iran has surpassed its quota of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day and is 
believed to be exporting between 2 and 2.5 million barrels per day. In the 
December 1982 OPEC ministerial meeting, Iran warned that OPEC pro-
duction quotas for each member country should be based on four fac-
tors: a country's oil resources, its need for foreign exchange, its popula-
tion, and the quantity of its petroleum exports in the past decade. The 
implementation of these proposals would be disadvantageous to the 
Arabs, especially the largest oil producer, Saudi Arabia. Iran's vast oil 
reserves, its continuing need for foreign exchange, its population of forty 
million and its position as the second largest OPEC oil producer before 
the revolution would all work in its favor. To counter Iran's demands, 
the Arabs engineered a move which bypassed the election of a new OPEC 
secretary general. Ironically, it was Iran's turn to have its representative 
occupy this seat. 
THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL 
In a move to contain Iran's regional influence the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) was established in 1981 by the conservative Gulf regimes 
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and 
Oman. The GCC was designed to coordinate the social and economic 
policies of these countries and further, to devise unified military and 
security programs.7 Although the ostensible military aim of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council was to coordinate security against possible internal 
and external subversion, the GCC was perceived by Tehran to be a pro-
Western scheme directed against the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
While Iranian leaders took pains to reassure the Arab regimes that 
Iran had no territorial claims on them and that it sought friendly rela-
tions with all states that were not under "U.S. control" and were not 
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"U.S. lackeys, like Egypt and Morocco,"8 the Iranian clerics cautioned 
the GCC that Tehran would not allow any country or group of countries 
to act as the policeman of the Persian Gulf. President Ali Khamanei 
warned the GCC members of Iran's determination to "crush" any exter-
nal plots against the country. In a broadcast on Radio Tehran, Dr. Ali 
Akbar Velayati, Iran's Foreign Minister, asserted: "As the strongest 
country in the region, we remind those who have ignored our presence 
that even the U.S. could not do anything against the will of our people."9 
The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament went even further by stating: "All 
of you together do not even constitute a major city. Your plots are not a 
problem for the Islamic Republic of Iran."10 
Nevertheless, the Iranian government was keenly aware of the 
potential military threat to the country's oil fields that might eminate 
from the GCC. That is, in a post-Khomeini Iran, the GCC could take ad-
vantage of the possible leadership vacuum in Tehran and launch a 
preemptive strike against key Iranian targets in the south. A 
U.S.-supported, Grenada-style invasion of Iran, in cooperation with the 
GCC, is a dangerous, though perhaps unlikely, option in the event that 
the post-Khomeini Iran became engulfed in anarchy and Western oil sup-
plies became threatened. Certainly, in this context the Iranian regime 
would have to take seriously the possible military threat from the GCC. 
THE ISRAELI FACTOR 
Iran's relationship with Israel had its genesis in 1950 when the 
Shah's regime extended de facto recognition to the Jewish state. Despite 
Iran's objections to the continued occupation of the Arab land captured 
by Israel in the 1967 war, the Shah's regime maintained close relations 
with Israel in economic and military spheres. Iran's trade relationship 
with Israel was quite extensive. Israeli exports to Iran had reached over 
$70 million by the mid-1970s, and Iran was the main supplier of oil to 
Israel during the Shah's regime. This relationship became especially 
critical after 1975 when Israel surrendered the Sinai oil fields of Ab 
Rudeis to Egypt. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Iranian-Israeli relations 
revolved around the military-intelligence axis. Israel's intelligence net-
work, Mossad, and the Shah's security organization, SAVAK, were in 
close contact for nearly twenty-five years. The extent of their coopera-
tion ranged from exchange of information to providing training for a 
number of SAVAK officials, both in Iran and in Israel.11 Military train-
ing was also provided by the Israelis for Iranian officers, and Iran 
became a major purchaser of arms from Israel in the last decade of the 
Pahlavi monarchy. 
Israeli arms supplies to Iran have allegedly continued since the 
Shah's overthrow, and in spite of Khomeini's vehemently anti-Israeli 
pronouncements. Regular contacts between Israeli and Iranian officers 
reportedly have been maintained. According to a story in the Israeli 
publication Ha'aretz, one such meeting took place between former 
Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon and a high ranking officer of the 
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Iranian army to discuss further sale of military spare parts to Iran.12 
The reports of Israeli-Iranian arms deals were first made public by 
an article in the Sunday Times of London and were later substantiated by 
other sources, including the exiled Iranian President, Abolhassan Bani 
Sadr.13 Apparently, the war with Iraq and Iran's need for spare parts for 
its American-made military hardware prompted the regime to purchase 
needed equipment from any available source, including Israel. As the 
Iranian Minister of Industry stated recently: "We get what we need 
where there are people who like to make a quick buck. And that means 
everywhere."14 
In September 1980, Israeli officials notified the U.S. administration 
of Iran's desire to purchase American-made military equipment from 
Israel. According to one account, because of the delicate negotiations 
over the American hostages held in the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the 
Carter administration did not act positively at that time. The Israeli 
government, nevertheless, proceeded to sell Iran spare parts for its F-4 
fighters, M-60 tanks, and a host of other items.13 Although Israel has 
been accused of continuous violations of the U.S. boycott of sale or 
transfer of weapons to Iran, there are indications that the U.S. govern-
ment has been at least aware of Israeli-Iranian arms deals. As a Reagan 
administration's State Department official put it: "We don't give a 
damn as long as Iran-Iraq carnage doesn't affect our allies in the region 
or alter the balance of power."16 
The Iranian government has denied the veracity of any arms deal 
with Israel and has called reports of such deals a conspiracy against the 
Islamic revolution by the enemies of the Islamic Republic.17 Despite the 
Iranian government's protestations to the contrary, Western sources and 
Iranian exiled politicians continue to provide documents alleging 
flourishing Iranian-Israeli arms deals. Former President Bani Sadr, for 
example, has provided copies of invoices sent by Kendal Holdings 
Limited, an Israeli-owned company domiciled in Liberia, to the Iranian 
Defense Ministry for the sale of weapons to Iran, including Sidewinder 
air-to-air missiles, radar equipment, and other military items.18 
According to Western sources, the Iranian-Israeli arms network is 
now led by Farrokh Azizi, an Iranian businessman in Athens and brother 
of Ali Azizi, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister. It also involves Israeli 
businessmen who had dealt with Iran under the Shah.19 Regardless of 
their validity, these allegations have given impetus to Iraq's efforts to ob-
tain more weapons and other supplies from friendly Arab states and por-
tray itself as a defender of the Arab cause against the Iranian-Israeli en-
croachments. 
THE NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE CONNECTION 
North Korea has been another major supplier of weapons to Iran, a 
fact acknowledged by the Iranian Prime Minister Musavi during his Oc-
tober 1983 visit to North Korea.20 Some of the weapons sent to Iran are 
of Western, especially American, origin which North Korea maintains in 
its inventory. However, increasingly "these arms originate in China."21 
In 1982 alone, Iran purchased two billion dollars worth of weapons from 
45 
Fall 1984 
North Korea, and a small contingent of Iranian pilots have undergone 
training in North Korea and have flown the Chinese equivalent of 
MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighters.22 
China's posture towards the Persian Gulf conflict has undergone a 
quiet metamorphosis. Like other major powers, the People's Republic of 
China declared its neutrality at the onset of the Iran-Iraq War. However, 
a series of events induced Peking to tilt toward Iran. First, in the summer 
of 1982, Moscow resumed shipment of arms to Iraq after a two-year 
hiatus. Second, Iran expelled eighteen Soviet diplomats on grounds of es-
pionage and other activities "injurious to the Islamic Republic." Third, 
the expulsion was followed by the arrest of the entire leadership of the 
pro-Moscow Tudeh (masses) Party and the detention of some 2,000 
members and sympathizers of Tudeh. These actions established "Iran's 
anti-Soviet credentials and pleased Peking,"23 greatly improving Sino-
Iranian relations which had been strained since the Iranian revolution, 
principally because of the Chinese support for the Shah's regime in the 
late 1970s.24 
Agreements have reportedly been reached to sell Iran, through 
North Korea, a yet unknown number of Chinese fighter planes Shenyang 
F-6 (a derivative of the Soviet MiG-19). Although no Shenyang F-6s have 
been delivered to Iran at the time of this writing (December 1983), it is 
nevertheless clear that Peking has decided, partly due to Iran's anti-
Soviet posture and partly as a means to increase its own foreign earnings, 
to enter the arms bazaar in the Persian Gulf. However, China has yet to 
acknowledge publicly its shift toward Iran for "fear of alienating its 
friends in the Arab world, particularly Egypt."25 
From a purely military point of view, the introduction of Shenyang 
F-6 fighters will not change the balance of power in the Gulf War, at 
least in the near future. However, it does mark the first significant step 
by Iran to lessen its dependence on Western advanced weaponry. Iranian 
armed forces in general, and the air force in particular, have traditionally 
been supplied, and their officers trained, by the West or in the Western 
techniques of warfare. Since the imposition of the American boycott of 
arms sales to Iran, the air force of the Islamic Republic has encountered 
severe logistical problems. Iran's operational aircraft, the bulk being F-4 
Phantoms, are now down to eighty in number, as compared to Iraq's 
four hundred operational fighter planes. By the same token, Iran's in-
ventory of seventy-seven F-14 fighters has been paralyzed by the lack of 
spare parts and the existence of maintenance problems. Consequently, 
the advanced F-14s have either been grounded or used sparingly and in 
non-combat operations.26 
Consequently the air force, once the strongest leg of the triad of the 
Iranian defense forces, is now the weakest of the country's service bran-
ches. With occasional bombing sorties, its function has been reduced to 
helping protect the country's major central cities, oil fields and 
refineries. The southwestern cities of Dezful, Ahwaz, and even 
Behbahan and Shiraz in the Fars province have been rendered 
defenseless. The Iranian counteroffensives against Iraq, which rely on 
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ground forces and "human wave" tactics, are without credible air cover. 
Colonel Sayyad Shirazi, the commander of the Iranian ground forces, 
has been successful in repulsing the Iraqi forces and defeating them in the 
Khuzestan province through relying on "human wave" assaults. 
However, the human cost (over 100,000 dead and wounded) has been ex-
tremely high. 
Iran's repeated efforts to procure combat aircraft from NATO or 
Warsaw Pact countries have been futile.27 It was in light of these 
obstacles that Iran's Supreme Defense Council authorized negotiations 
for the purchase of Chinese Shenyang F-6 combat aircrafts. One should 
exercise caution in overemphasizing the so-called China connection; 
nonetheless, Peking could certainly benefit from Tehran's policy of 
"neither East nor West" by becoming a major supplier of Iran's armed 
forces, especially if the anti-Western feelings of Iran and anti-Iranian at-
titudes of the U.S. continue to persist. 
THE CAIRO-RIYADH-AMMAN AXIS AND 
THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE GULF WAR 
Egypt 
Despite its ostracism from much of the Arab world since the Camp 
David accords, Egypt has increasingly become involved in the military 
affairs in the Persian Gulf region. Under both Anwar Sadat and Hosni 
Mubarak, Egypt has linked its security with stability in the Persian Gulf. 
Perceived threats from the Soviet Union and, since 1979, from Iran have 
brought about closer military relations between Egypt and some Gulf 
countries, especially Oman.28 Cairo has already demonstrated its will-
ingness to support American military operations in the region. The abor-
tive 1980 U.S. hostage rescue attempt in Iran originated in Egypt. Cairo 
has also provided base facilities for American forces and participated 
with them in joint military exercises under the banner of "Bright Star" 
operations. These have ostensibly been designed to enhance Egypt's 
defensive capabilities as well as its possible interventionist capacity in the 
Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, Cairo has once again taken an active interest in stan-
dardizing fighter planes among pro-Western Arab countries and 
establishing a "maintenance facility capable of handling Soviet-built, 
French and U.S. fighters from throughout the region."29 In the past, 
Egypt had attempted to set up an indigenous Arab arms production in-
dustry, partly to standardize weapon systems among the Arab countries. 
The result was the establishment in 1975 of the Arab Organization for In-
dustrialization (AOI), set up in Egypt and financed by Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. However, this project died in its in-
fancy, shortly after Israeli-Egyptian rapprochement and the consequent 
withdrawal of financial backing by its Arab supporters.30 In place of the 
AOI, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq and United Arab Emirates 
agreed in 1979 to finance an $8 billion arms industry headquartered in 
the United Arab Emirates.31 Although this scheme is now theoretically 
under the Gulf Cooperation Council, the non-GCC Iraq will most cer-
tainly become a chief beneficiary. 
47 
Fall 1984 
Egypt, in the meantime, has developed plans to co-produce or to 
assemble a variety of advanced weapon systems, principally under license 
from Western countries. In the area of co-production, Egypt has discuss-
ed the possibility of working on the "General Dynamics F-16A, the Nor-
throp F-20 and Dassault-Breguet Mirage X, an improved Mirage 5 with a 
new engine, new avionics suite, increased internal fuel capacity and 
system changes."32 Both General Dynamics and Northrup have been 
negotiating with Egypt since July 1983 to draw up an agreement for co-
production of their F-16A and F-20 fighters, respectively. However, 
talks with General Dynamics have lagged behind those with Northrup33 
and France, for its part, has yet to make an offer on terms and condi-
tions for co-production of Mirage X fighter planes. Egypt appears to be 
counting on funding "from a third country such as Saudi Arabia or Iraq 
for the co-production program,"34 as Cairo views these as Arab, rather 
than purely Egyptian, endeavors. 
The Iraqis have been supplied with Chinese F-6 and F-7 fighters, 
principally through Egypt and Jordan. According to an authoritative 
report, Chinese versions of Soviet Mikoyan MiG-21s (designated as F-7s) 
and MiG 19s (F-6s), which are assembled in Egypt, are shipped to Iraq.35 
Similarly, approximately thirty Chinese F-6 fighters assembled at King 
Faisal Air Base in southern Jordan have been sent to the Iraqi govern-
ment. In addition, both Egypt and Jordan are "supplying technical sup-
port to Iraq to assist in maintaining combat operational aircraft."36 
However, Iraq is neither now nor will it be in the near future in a 
position to finance Egyptian joint production of advanced weapons. The 
Baghdad regime is heavily in debt (over $35 billion) as a result of its war 
with Iran, its economy is in a state of disarray. (It is, also, see below, pro-
viding a substantial amount of money for Jordanian defense.) The 
Saudis, on the other hand, will most likely be hesitant to see the introduc-
tion of additional F-16 fighters in the region as the aircraft could serious-
ly escalate the Gulf conflict and provoke Iran to retaliate in some 
fashion. 
Jordan 
Jordan has long been a perennial favorite of Washington in the Mid-
dle East.37 The Reagan administration's peace intitiative rests heavily on 
Jordanian acceptance of a West Bank Palestinian entity associated with 
and under its supervision and control. Despite its pro-Western posture, 
Jordan has been able to develop a close military relationship with the 
"radical" Iraq to establish the Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian axis to counter the 
Syrian-Libyan axis.38 For its part, Iraq has provided Jordan, a front line 
state in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with funds to fortify its defense. Part of 
Jordan's air defense weapons (Soviet-built SA-8 mobile launchers and 
radar-directed Shilka ZSU-23-4 mobile guns) were financed by Iraq. 
Moreover, Iraq is "known to be paying for at least 24 Mirages at a unit 
flyaway cost of $15-18 million and a program unit cost of approximately 
$30 million each."39 
The reason for such an outlay is relatively simple; Iraq has found in 
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Jordan a competent rival to its chief nemesis in the Arab east — Syria. 
By funding Jordan's defense requirements, Iraq has sought to check 
Syria's aggrandizement of her own position in the Middle East. Similar-
ly, Jordan has found it desirable to support Iraq in the Gulf War as a 
response to Syria's support for Iran. Jordan became the first country 
publicly to defend Iraq's invasion of Iran, and it has continued to sup-
port Saddam Hussein's regime with arms and military manpower. Jor-
dan's Red Sea port of Aqaba has served as a major conduit through 
which arms and other goods reach their Iraqi destination and Jordanian 
"volunteers," although their numbers have been militarily insignificant, 
have fought alongside the Iraqi regular forces against Iran. 
The Jordanian armed forces are, in fact, one of the best trained and 
equipped military groups in the Middle East.40 The Reagan administra-
tion even designed a plan to organize a strike force of Jordanian units to 
be deployed in the Persian Gulf (presumably against Iran or domestic 
threats to the Gulf regimes), although the U.S. Senate refused to fund 
the force for fear it could be turned against Israel. King Hussein's major 
concern, however, has been portrayed by some to be the outcome of the 
Gulf War and the potential of a strike force in that context. William 
Beeman has stated categorically that Jordan's Hussein is 
petrified at the thought of an Iranian victory in the war 
with Iraq; he is certain that the Shi'ite rule in Baghdad 
soon would target him for destruction. It is for this 
reason that Hussein has agreed to cooperate with the 
United States in establishing a Jordanian Rapid Deploy-
ment Force for possible intervention in the Gulf 
region."41 
Saudi Arabia 
Of all the regional states, Saudi Arabia is perhaps most fearful of 
the spill-over effects of the Iran-Iraq War. Saudi military build-up since 
the onset of the Gulf War in 1980 is as much the product of Saudi 
Arabia's perception of the Soviet threat as it is the result of the Saudi 
monarchy's growing vulnerability to Iran's ideological challenge.42 Prior 
to the Iranian revolution, the Saudis became grudgingly resigned to the 
massive build-up of the Shah's military power in neighboring Iran. 
However, Iran's emergence as a regional "superpower," along with the 
Shah's willingness to project the country's military power beyond the 
Persian Gulf and into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, were view-
ed with considerable unease in Riyadh. The Saudis were resentful of their 
role as the junior partner of Iran in Washington's security scheme in the 
region, and they were never "comfortable with the dominant position 
that Iran under the Shah was creating for itself in the Persian Gulf."43 
With the overthrow of the Shah's regime and the apparent 
neutralization of Iran as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the 
Persian Gulf, Washington proceeded to accelerate the militarization of 
Saudi Arabia. This process began under the Carter administration when 
the Saudis were sold sixty F-15 Eagle fighters as part of the "plane 
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package" of 1978, which included further sales of F-15s and F-16s to 
Israel and the less sophisticated F-SEs to Egypt. 
Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of the Khuzestan province of Iran, 
the Saudis requested and received four USAF AW ACS (Airborne Warn-
ing and Control System) radar planes, presumably to protect them from 
possible military attacks from Iran. The radar planes have been based at 
the Riyadh air base and are operated by U.S. crews with Saudi pilots pre-
sent. The Iranian government has suspected that information gathered 
by these U.S.-controlled AW ACS is passed on to the Iraqis by Saudi 
Arabia. Tehran has also viewed the introduction of AW ACS in the Gulf 
as yet another manifestation of American strategy of encircling the 
Islamic Republic by its "puppets and traitors to Islam."44 
The Iranian suspicion of a U.S.-Saudi collusion was heightened 
when the Reagan administration, after one of the most intensive lobby-
ing and counter-lobbying efforts in the history of arms sales, obtained 
congressional approval for the sale of five AW ACS planes to Saudi 
Arabia.45 Equally disturbing, from the Iranian point of view, was the 
concomittant approval of the sale of additional F-1S Eagles with advanc-
ed air-to-air Sidewinder missiles, extra fuel tanks for aerial refueling and 
bomb racks. The Iranians charged that F-1S fighters with enhanced 
capabilities could be used for deep strikes inside Iran, with the AW ACS 
functioning as their command and monitoring platform. 
For the Saudis, however, the AW ACS and F-15 sales were the litmus 
test of the "special relationship" that exists between Washington and 
Riyadh. Implicit in this "special relationship" is the willingness of the 
United States to provide advanced weapon systems to Saudi Arabia and 
its allies in the region. In addition, co-production of advanced U.S. 
weapons has increasingly been viewed by pro-Western regional leaders as 
another dimension of America's commitment to the security of their 
respective regimes. Co-production has also been judged to be a way 
around congressional recalcitrance and objections to the sale of 
sophisticated U.S. weapons to the Gulf Arab states. 
As was alluded to earlier, Northrup Corporation has already entered 
into negotiations for the possible co-production of its F-20 Tigershark 
fighters in Egypt and Pakistan, with the funding from Saudi Arabia and 
other conservative Gulf states. The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jor-
dan, Egypt and Pakistan seem to concur that the F-20 Tigershark would 
provide "an aircraft that could be easily absorbed and maintained in 
smaller nations such as those in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
while obtaining a less costly fighter with agility and weapons system 
characteristics paralleling those of the F-16."46 
In addition to its attractive technical features, such as its rapid 
engine start time (sixteen seconds), rate of climb (52,750 feet per minute) 
and look-up radar mode, the F-20 has been offered at a comparably low 
price of $10.3 million (in constant Fiscal 1983 dollars). Northrup Cor-
poration is vigorously pursuing the sale of 150 of these F-20s to Saudi 
Arabia and fifty to eighty units to the United Arab Emirates.47 The in-
troduction of F-20s, be it through co-production with regional countries 
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or through direct sales by Northrup, will further destabilize the volatile 
balance of power in the Gulf and would further exacerbate the resolution 
of regional conflicts. 
Syria and Libya 
From the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, Syria and Libya have been among 
the most ardent supporters of non-Arab Iran, much to the chagrin of 
most Arab states. In addition to providing political support, both Syria 
and Libya have assisted Iran with arms and medical supplies. The extent 
of military support given by these two countries to Iran has been the sub-
ject of much speculation and varying interpretations. As the bulk of 
Iran's armed forces is equipped with Western, especially American, 
weapon systems, neither Syria nor Libya (both of which rely heavily on 
the Soviet weapons) could have possibly provided Iran with advanced 
weapons from their own arsenals. Furthermore, unlike North Korea, 
neither of these two countries maintains such weapon systems in its in-
ventory. In other words, weapons supplied by either Syria or Libya have 
not disturbed the balance of power in the Gulf region. 
Contrary to popular reportings in the West, Iran's relations with 
Libya have not been as cordial as they are commonly assumed to be. A 
persistent source of tension in Iranian-Libyan relations has been the fate 
of Imam Musa Sadr, the Iranian-born spiritual leader of the Shi'ite com-
munity in Lebanon. Imam Musa Sadr disappeared while on an official 
visit to Libya in the late 1970s.48 Also, Libya has become increasingly 
critical of Iran's denunciations of the Soviet Union as a "satanic" power 
and the mass arrest of Tudeh Party leadership and Tudeh members. 
Syria's identification with the Iranian cause is more a matter of 
political expediency than a reflection of its genuine commitment to the 
principles of the Islamic revolution espoused by the Iranian clerics. In 
fact, Syria, as one of the most secular states in the Middle East, has dealt 
harshly with its own resurgent Islamic movements, particularly with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. As was mentioned earlier, Syria's alliance with 
Iran is, rather, a reflection of President Assad's desire to counterbalance 
the pressures exerted on his own regime by Iraq and Jordan. 
Syria's relations with Iraq, strained for several years over 
inter-Ba'ath differences, deteriorated rapidly after the onset of the Gulf 
War. By allying itself with Iran, Syria has been able to take advantage of 
the Iraqi army's preoccupation in the eastern front and concentrate on 
carrying out Syrian policies in Lebanon without worrying about a 
military threat from Iraq. Furthermore, Syria's support of Iran can part-
ly be explained as a consequence of Damascus' deteriorating relations 
with Amman. In 1980, when Jordan "substituted a new alliance with 
Iraq for the virtually defunct Syrian alliance,"49 Damascus felt isolated 
in the Arab East and became desperate in its search for allies to stem the 
rising tide of the Baghdad-Amman military axis. A rapprochement with 
Jordan or Iraq could conceivably sway Damascus away from its support 
of the Islamic Republic and towards a new inter-Arab alliance. 
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WHITHER THE GULF CONFLICT? 
The conflict in the Persian Gulf is a classic case of an intra-Third 
World conflict whose management has become exceedingly difficult with 
the passage of time. Although it could be argued that political and 
ideological differences between Khomeini's Iran and the Ba'athist Iraq 
would have made the occurence of the Gulf War likely and its manage-
ment difficult,50 nevertheless, the massive destruction of human lives and 
economic infrastructures of both countries would have been less severe 
had the transfer of weapons to the warring parties been curtailed. Cer-
tainly major arms suppliers to Iran and Iraq must bear a significant share 
of responsibility in the continuing carnage in the Gulf. In so far as both 
countries have the means to obtain weapons from abroad and consider-
ing the rigidity of the positions of both sides on the terms of the settle-
ment of their conflict, there will be little incentive to end the war. Conti-
nuing failure of the United Nations, non-aligned, and the Islamic Con-
ference mediation efforts is hardly surprising in light of the aforemen-
tioned fact.51 
There is a greater need for international management of the Gulf 
conflict. At present, there seems to be no coordination or "rules of the 
game" between the two superpowers to maintain "the lid on their com-
petition"52 in the region. Despite the announced superpower neutrality in 
the Gulf War, the Soviet Union has resumed shipment of arms to Iraq, 
perhaps as a result of Iran's increasingly anti-Soviet posture. The United 
States seems to be entertaining the idea of "tilting" toward Iraq, partly 
as a response to alleged Iranian complicity in the fall 1983 truck-bombing 
of U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut and Iran's threats to close the 
Strait of Hormuz if its oil flow is stopped by Iraqi air attacks.53 Other 
justification advanced for abandoning U.S. neutrality and siding with 
Iraq include Iraq's gestures to improve relations with the United States, 
its expulsion of most of the Soviet advisors from the country, the support 
given by Iraq to the Gulf Cooperative Council, and the country's effec-
tiveness as a counter-weight to Syria's influence in the Middle East.54 
On the other hand, as Thomas McNaugher has noted, such a shift 
would "serve no useful American purpose and might indeed be a grave 
mistake."55 Iraq's major financial patrons, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
are no longer willing (or able) to subsidize the war. Baghdad's own 
revenues have been dropped drastically as its Persian Gulf outlet (Khor 
al-Amaya and Mina al-Bakr terminals) has been rendered unusable and 
its pipeline traversing through Syria to the Mediterranean Sea has been 
shut by the Damascus regime, though small quantities of oil are still ex-
ported through the Iraqi pipeline crossing Turkey. Apparently Iran is 
willing to allow this overland pipeline through Turkey to operate because 
of the burgeoning Iranian-Turkish economic ties. President Ali 
Khamanei reaffirmed this view stating: "Because Turkish interests are 
dear to us, we will not attack the Iraqi pipeline that goes through 
Turkey."56 
The Iranian economy is in somewhat better shape. Iran's main 
petroleum shipping terminal on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf has 
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been operating at near full capacity, allowing the country to export an 
average of two million barrels, per day.37 At the same time, the Islamic 
Republic has been relatively successful in engaging the Iraqis in a war of 
attrition which the Iraqi economy is no longer able to sustain. 
Dissatisfaction in the ranks of the Iraqi army and among high level 
functionaries is widespread. The power struggle has even reached Presi-
dent Saddam Hussein's family and his village of Tikrit. Hussein's three 
step-brothers have reportedly been arrested as ring leaders of a recent 
coup attempt against his regime.38 Considering the deteriorating 
political, military and economic conditions in Iraq, Saddam Hussein has 
embarked upon a course of action to internationalize the Gulf War and 
bring about the active involvement of the superpowers. The recent 
delivery of five French Super Etendard planes, with the ability to use Ex-
ocet missiles effectively against moving tankers, could provoke Iran into 
fulfilling its oft-repeated promise to close the Strait of Hormuz, thereby 
necessitating a direct American military action in the Persian Gulf 
region. In the event of Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the United 
States "would wind up doing what Iraq cannot do for itself. The chances 
of this may be very slim, but Iraq has little to lose by trying,"59 to force 
the issue. A bellicose U.S. posture would, as it has in the past, play into 
the hands of the Soviet Union and would raise questions regarding U.S. 
intentions and ultimate motives in the region.60 More than likely, a U.S. 
military intervention in the Gulf would be viewed as an attempt to 
destablize or overthrow the Iranian revolutionary regime. As Feinberg 
and Oye have noted: "In practice, American destablization programs 
have worked best against moderate or elected nationalists, such as 
Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran, Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala, and 
Salvador Allende of Chile... . Fearing subversion, future revolutionary 
elites will be more inclined to move quickly to consolidate their control 
and to seek Soviet bloc security assistance."61 
The Iran-Iraq War will most likely continue until the Iraq regime 
has fallen or until there emerges a major realignment of domestic forces 
in Iran. At present, the former is a more likely possibility. In the mean-
time, the intensity and rigidity of the Iranian and Iraqi claims and 
counterclaims and their adamant desire to seek victory, military or other-
wise, in the Gulf War accentuates the urgency of limiting arms transfers 




* An earlier version of this article was read at the 1983 meeting of the Southern Section 
of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia. 
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